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Although many studies find that voting in Africa approximates an ethnic census in that 
voting is primarily along ethnic lines, hardly any of the studies have sought to explain 
ethnic voting following a rational choice framework. Using data of voter opinions 
from a survey conducted two weeks before the December 2007 Kenyan elections, we 
ﬁnd that the expected beneﬁts associated with a win by each of the presidential 
candidates varied signiﬁcantly across voters from different ethnic groups. We 
hypothesize that decision to participate in the elections was inﬂuenced by the expected 
beneﬁts as per the minimax-regret voting model. We test the predictions of this model 
using data of voter turnout in the December 2007 elections and ﬁnd that turnout 
across ethnic groups varied systematically with expected beneﬁts. The results suggest 
that individuals participated in the elections primarily to avoid the maximum regret 
should a candidate from another ethnic group win. The results therefore offer 
credence to the minimax regret model as proposed by Ferejohn and Fiorina (1974) 
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I. Introduction 
 
A well-known prediction of the rational voter hypothesis as formulated by Downs 
(1957) and extended by Tullock (1967) and Riker and Ordeshook (1968), is that, given 
the extremely low probability that an individual voter brings about the victory of a 
candidate or issue, rational self-interested individuals should not vote. However, this 
outcome contradicts the observed behavior of voters: many vote even in those 
elections where the probability of one’s vote being pivotal is miniscule (that is when 
the number of voters ”N” is large such that the probability of a voter being decisive 
approaches zero). Given that rationality and self interest assumptions are applicable in 
political markets as well as in private markets, this outcome presents a paradox. An 
interesting focus in the study of the economics of voting has been an attempt to 
unravel why rational people vote when the expected beneﬁts from voting are likely to 
be much less than the costs.  
Several plausible theories to explain the paradox of voting have been 
proposed.
2 
In one such attempt, Ferejohn and Fiorina (1974; 1975), seek to rescue 
‘rational choice theorists from this embarrassing predicament’ and propose an 
alternative voting theory whereby the motivation for voting is to minimize possible 
maximum regret-the minimax-regret strategy. Ferejohn and Fiorina argue that voters 
cannot assign probabilities to outcomes under uncertainty. Instead, they compute 
regrets (losses) associated with different strategies and choose the strategy that 
minimizes maximum possible regret. Thus, in this formulation, the voter is motivated 
to vote in order to avoid regretting should a less preferred candidate or issue were to 
be selected as a result of the voter abstaining. Although the minimax-regret model 
others a promising explanation of voter participation, it has been challenged on 
theoretical grounds. For example, the model has been criticized because of its extreme 
assumption of complete uncertainty concerning probabilities of electoral outcomes. 
Furthermore, the model lacks strong empirical support (Blais et al. 1995).  
In this paper, we provide evidence that others credence to the theory of voting 
on the basis of minimax-regret. We utilize unique data of opinions by prospective 
Kenyan voters obtained through a survey conducted two weeks before the 27 
December 2007 elections. The information on voter opinions is complemented with 
evidence of actual turnout in the election as reported by the Kenyan Electoral 
Commission. By evaluating voter opinions on a number of issues, we present payoff 
and regret matrices from which we formulate plausible hypotheses and predictions 
about voting behavior. Our results suggest that ethnic voting patterns are to a large 
extent the outcome of voting on the basis of minimax-regret. In Section II, we provide 
a brief summary of voter opinions and also simple payoff and regret matrices followed 
by some empirical results of voter turnout. Section III concludes with suggestions for 





                                                 
2 See Dowding (2005) and Geys (2006) for a recent survey of various studies that have sought to resolve 
the voting paradox.  
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II. Minimax-Regret and Tribal Voting 
The introduction of competitive party politics in Kenya has generally been associated 
with increased ethnic polarization (Muigai 1995; Oyugi 1997; Kimenyi 1997; Orvis 
2001). Of considerable concern is that competitive elections have been marred by 
widespread ethnic violence (Kimenyi and Ndung’u 2005). In December 2007, Kenya 
held what was probably the most competitive presidential election since independence. 
The three leading candidates included the incumbent president Mwai Kibaki (Party of 
National Unity-PNU), Raila Odinga (Orange Democratic Movement-ODM), and 
Kalonzo Musyoka (Orange Democratic Movement-Kenya-ODM-K). 
3 As the election 
date approached, opinion polls showed that Kibaki and Odinga were in a statistical tie 
and it was difficult to predict a winner with any degree of certainty. Such a 
competitive and peaceful electoral process should foster conﬁdence in the institutions 
of democracy. Unfortunately, the election process ended up in a dispute followed by 
unprecedented levels of violence and displacement of people thereby weakening the 
institutions of governance considerably. The analysis in this paper sheds light on why 
and how Kenyans voted, and what factors could have triggered divisions of the 
electorate and subsequent post-election violence.  
About two weeks before the 27 December 2007 general election, researchers 
from the University of Oxford, University of Connecticut and Michigan State 
University, conducted a survey of voter opinions. The primary purpose of the survey 
was to gather information on key factors inﬂuencing voter preferences. The survey 
collected information on a wide range of voter characteristics and also opinions about 
the government, accountability, violence, candidate and party preferences, etc. The 
survey sample included 1,207 Kenyans aged 18 and over from all of the country’s 
eight provinces, and covering 76 out of 210 electoral constituencies. The sample is 
nationally representative and as such captures the rural-urban split; and the ethnic 
distribution of the sample respondents mirrors the ethnic distribution of the national 
population according to the country’s latest population Census (see also Bratton and 
Kimenyi, 2008).  
The survey data provide a unique opportunity to explore what motivated 
Kenyans to vote and what shaped their voting intentions. To understand voting 
intentions we started by asking likely voters to state the main issue motivating them to 
select their preferred presidential candidate. As data in Figure 1 shows, 90 per cent of 
the population stated that they would select a candidate based on the candidate’s track-
record of honesty in managing public services and care for the community. Perhaps, 
most surprisingly, only less than one per cent of survey respondents (0.80 percent) 
stated that the ethnicity of the candidate was the most important factor in shaping their 
voting motivations. From the responses to this question we might infer that voters are 






                                                 
3 Although there were several other  presidential candidates, only three had national support and all others 
were marginal with limited following. 
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Nevertheless, a different picture emerges when we look at the voting intentions 
according to voters’ ethnicity. Figure 2 presents intentions of voters from three ethnic 
groups that also had major presidential candidates. The Figure shows that there is a 
clear uniform pattern in the voting intentions of each ethnic group. The three main 
presidential candidates, Kibaki (a Kikuyu), Odinga (a Luo) and Kalonzo (a Kamba) 
were overwhelmingly supported by members of their own ethnic groups. Even voters 
from other ethnic groups that did not have a major presidential candidate contending 
in the elections were strongly aligned to one of the three main presidential candidates. 
Thus, on the one hand, voters indicate that their primary motivation for candidate 
choice is driven by policy and the character of the candidate. On the other hand, when 
asked how they intend to vote, clear ethnic patterns emerge.  
 
Figure 2. Voting Intentions by People’s Tribe of Origin 



















We explore further possible reasons for this apparent contradiction between 
stated factors inﬂuencing the choice of a candidate and the tendency to vote along 
ethnic lines. One possible reason could be that preferences over issues and policy vary 
systematically and in distinct ways across ethnic groups. In other words, the positions 
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of the median ethnic voter vary substantially across the various ethnic groups. Another 
possible explanation might be that there is low level trust amongst ethnic groups. Lack 
of trust might motivate voters to select a candidate from own ethnic group over an 
otherwise better candidate just because they may not trust leaders from other ethnic 
groups. In the survey, one question sought to investigate social distance between 
groups by focusing on expressed trust of members of other ethnic groups. As Table 1 
shows, Kenyans mistrust members of other ethnic groups. Very few respondents 
indicated that they trust members outside their own ethnic group a lot. The lack of 
trust of people from other ethnic groups is particularly high among those of Kikuyu 
and Luo origin. For these two groups, up to 60 percent of the respondents do not trust 
at all or trust only a little, people from other ethnic groups.
4  
 




How much do you trust Kenyans from other 
ethnic groups? 
  Not at all  Just  a 
little 
Somewhat A  lot 
Kikuyu 20.8  42.0  28.8 7.5 
Luo 20.3  41.9  30.4  4.7 
Kamba 6.2 43.8  44.6  4.5 
Luhya 16.3  42.6  28.9  5.8 
Kalejin 13.6  45.6  30.1  9.7 
Mijikenda 2.7  36.0  41.3  13.3 
ALL 14.3  42.6  31.9  7.8 
 
 
Given the apparent extensive lack of trust expressed by respondents, it is of 
interest to determine which ethnic groups mistrust each other most and also to unravel 
why this might be the case. We do so in an indirect way by asking respondents 
whether they feel particularly distant from a speciﬁc political party. Given that 
political parties are overwhelmingly supported by speciﬁc ethnic groups, assessing 
whether people feel very distant to a party might tell us which ethnic groups they do 
not trust.  
The results reported in Table 2 reveal that 40 percent of respondents stated that 
they felt very distant from some speciﬁc political party. Of the Kikuyus, over 50 
percent felt distant from the ODM (a party supported mainly by Luos, Kalenjin and 
Luhyas). Likewise, a similar proportion of Luos stated that they felt distant from the 
PNU (a party supported mainly by Kikuyu, Embu and Merus). The data also show that 
other ethnic groups felt very distant from the three main political parties. For instance, 
the Kambas felt very distant from the ODM, while the Luhya, Kalenjin and Mijikenda 
felt very distant from the PNU. From this evidence we can infer that the high levels of 
mistrust across ethnic groups extend to the political arena. Furthermore, it is possible 
                                                 
4 It is important to note that the information does not really tell us who the groups mistrust. In other words, 
we cannot conclude that the responses represent mistrust of the two groups. This is possible but not 
conclusive from the data. 
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to infer which groups mistrust each other most. In this case, it does appear that there is 
a very high level of mistrust between the Kikuyus and Luos.  
 





Do you feel very distant from any particular 
party and which party is that? 
 ODM  ODM-K  PNU  NA 
Kikuyu 52.7  5.8 2.7  35.4 
Luo 3.4  4.1  53.4  36.5 
Kamba 30.4  1.8 9.8  58.0 
Luhya 12.6  2.6  44.7  36.3 
Kalejin 7.8 1.9 41.7  9.7 
Mijikenda 5.3  10.7  28.0  50.7 
ALL 42.9  6.9  33.0  7.8 
 
 
To explain why voting behaviour might be inﬂuenced by the expressed 
mistrust of other ethnic groups, we look into some possible sources of mistrust. During 
the election campaign, the opposition candidates raised issues of ethnic favouritism 
and discrimination by the incumbent government. Such perceptions could breed 
mistrust and grievances that may motivate voters to revert to ethnic voting. In the 
survey, one question sought to gather information about respondents’ perceptions of 
how their own ethnic group was treated by the incumbent government relative to other 
ethnic groups. Table 3 reports the summary of the responses by ethnicity. The most 
salient result concerns the responses of the Luo and Kikuyu. While only 3.1 percent of 
Kikuyus felt that their group was treated worse or much worse than others, this ﬁgure 
was 41.9 percent for Luos. Likewise, while over 20 percent of Kikuyus consider that 
their group is treated better or much better, for Luo respondents this ﬁgure is only 4.1 
percent.  





Is your group’s treatment by government, worse, 
the same or better 
 Much 
worse
Worse Same  Better Much 
Better 
NA 
Kikuyu 0  3.1  31.4  16.8  4.9  43.8 
Luo 10.1  31.8  17.6  2.7  1.4  36.5 
Kamba 0.9  10.7  31.2  3.6  0.9  52.7 
Luhya 1.1  7.4  21.6  10  1.1  56.8 
Kalejin 4.9  7.8  34.0  1.9  0.0  50.5 
Mijikenda 2.7  28.0 13.3 5.3  0.0  50.7 
ALL 2.6  13.5  25.8  9.1    1.9  46.4 
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Voter opinions and perceptions are informative in terms of ethnic groups’ 
expectations. Low trust of members of other ethnic groups implies that it is unlikely 
that the majority of voters would trust candidates from other ethnic groups over a 
candidate from their own group. Likewise, distance from a particular party also 
suggests that voters expect to beneﬁt much less were such party to win the election. 
Thus, if we focus on Kikuyu and Luo voters, it is clear that Kikuyus expect much 
lower beneﬁts from leadership under the ODM, while Luo voters expect low beneﬁts 
from leadership under the PNU. In other words, the opinions convey signiﬁcant 
differences in expectations of beneﬁts to the two groups depending on which party 
wins. Luos beneﬁt a great deal from an ODM win and Kikuyus beneﬁt from a PNU 
win. According to Ferejohn and Fiorina, it is such expectations of beneﬁts that 
primarily drive voting on the basis of minimax-regret.  
The above conclusion is supported by the opinions of ethnic group treatment 
by the government. Here we observe two distinct perceptions about treatment by 
incumbent government: perceived preferential treatment (PT) to Kikuyus and 
Discriminatory treatment (DT) to Luos. Table 4 and 5 represents the payoff and regret 
matrices suggested by these responses. Suppose Odinga were to win. A Luo voter 
would expect, ﬁrst, a gain by elimination of perceived discriminatory treatment (DT). 
At the same time, it is conceivable that the Luo voter would also expect a gain of PT 
(preferential treatment) under Odinga leadership. On the other hand, a win by Kibaki 
would result in PT to Kikuyus while a loss would yield 0 (zero) beneﬁts (equivalent to 
elimination of the preferential treatment). 
5 Table 5 represents the regret matrix. As is 
evident, the worst possible outcome for both groups is a win by a candidate from 
another ethnic group. Of note also is that, based on the foregoing discussion, the 
highest payoff is to Luo voters if Odinga wins followed by Kikuyus voters if Kibaki 
wins. This is because the Luos would expect a gain in DT (elimination of perceived 
discriminatory treatment) and also a PT (expected preferential treatment) while 
Kikuyus would only expect PT (preferential treatment) under a Kibaki regime.  
 
Table 4: Ethnic Voting Payoff Matrix 
      Presidential Candidate and Group of origin  Ethnicity of Voter 
Odinga (Luo)  Wins  Kibaki- (Kibaki) Wins 
Luo Voter  PT-DT DT 








                                                 
5 We assume that there are no expectations of discrimination against Kikuyus under Odinga leadership. 
This might not be the case and it is possible that Kikuyus had expectations of discrimination if Odinga won. 
However, we have no information to support such expectations. 
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Table 5: Ethnic Voting Regret Matrix 
 
      Presidential Candidate and Group of origin  Ethnicity of Voter 
Odinga (Luo)  Wins  Kibaki- (Kibaki) Wins 
Luo Voter  0  PT + (-DT) 
Kikuyu Voter  -PT 0 
 
 
Simple tests of  Minimax-Regret Voting 
We now turn to predictions of turnout. In the expected utility model, the decision to 
vote is based on net beneﬁts shown as: R = BP-C, where R is the rewards from voting, 
B is the difference in utility a voter expects to receive if the preferred candidate wins, 
P is the probability that an individual’s vote is decisive and C is the cost of voting. The 
key distinction between the Downsian expected utility model and that of the minimax-
regret is that, in the expected utility maximization model, the value of P and therefore 
the closeness of an election, drives turnout. On the other hand, in the minimax-regret 
model, closeness is not an important determinant of voting and instead it is the 
expected beneﬁts net of costs that determine voter turnout.  
  
(i) Value of P and Turnout in the Kenyan Elections-Constituencies: 
The predication of the Downsian model is that voter turnout is positively related to the 
closeness of the election. On the other hand, voting on minimax-regret does not 
depend on closeness. Thus, a simple test of how closeness inﬂuenced turnout in the 
Kenyan elections can reveal which of the two theories of voting performs better. Using 
reported data on actual votes cast during the 2007 presidential elections and the 
number of registered voters across the 209 constituencies that held elections, we 
compute a measure of closeness using the percentage gross margin (PGM).
6 
The gross 
margin is smaller the closer the election and larger the larger the difference between 
the votes cast for winning candidate and the second most popular candidate. We then 
estimate a simple regression model with percentage turnout as the dependent variable 
(TURNOUT) and percentage gross margin (PGM) as the independent variable.
7 
We 
also include the number of registered voters (REG) to capture potential free rider 
effects on turnout. According to the expected utility maximization model, we expect 
turnout to increase as the gross margin decreases (hence a negative relationship). On 
the other hand, if voting is on the basis of the minimax-regret, turnout should decrease 
as the gross margin decreases (hence a positive relationship). The ordinary least 





                                                 
6 There are 210 parliamentary constituencies but elections in 2 constituencies were nulliﬁed.  
7 Percentage Gross Margin in a particular constituency is computed by subtracting the votes cast for the 
second place candidate from those of the winning candidate and dividing by total votes cast multiplied by 
100. 
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(1)   TURNOUT =      57.573       +       0.214 PGM 
                    (41.88)***                (11.22)***         Adjusted R-Square: 0.375 
 
(2)   TURNOUT  =    104.152    +   0.228 PGN   –  0.430 ln REG 
                      (7.19)***      (11.89)***       (-3.23)***  Adjusted R-Square: 0.40 
 
 
These results show that turnout is higher in constituencies where the election is 
less ”close”, thus supporting voting on the basis of minimax-regret. At least, even if 
the results might not be conclusive, we can, with a fair degree of certainty conclude 
that voters’ estimation of P did not inﬂuence voting at the constituency level.
8 
 
(ii) Expected B and Turnout in the Kenyan Elections-Ethnic Groups: 
We have already observed that Kikuyu and Luo voters appear to be the two groups 
with the most to gain or lose depending on whether Kibaki or Odinga were to win. 
This is conveyed in the information about distance from political parties and also how 
the groups perceive their treatment by the government.  Based on the information 
provided in Tables 3 to 5, and focusing on the expected benefits, we can predict that 
turnout should not only be  highest among the Kikuyu and Luo voters but the gross 
margins those constituencies that  are dominated  by each of the groups should be 
high.  This is confirmed in Table 6. Thus, we demonstrate minimax-regret  voting by 
the existence of both high turnout and high gross margins.  
But this conclusion might be challenged on the basis that it is probably because 
leading presidential candidates were from the two groups. However, looking at voting 
by Kambas, we notice that the gross margins are even higher than for the Kikuyus. 
Nevertheless, turnout was much lower. This is consistent to the expected benefits- 58 
% do not feel distant from any party and about 30% consider the treatment of their 
group to be the same as other groups.  Turnout by voters from other ethnic groups is 
consistent with the expected benefits inferred form Table 3 and 4.  Thus, overall, we 
can conclude that a primary factor driving Kenyans to the ballot box is the expected 
benefits and thus they vote on the basis of minimax-regret. 
 
Table: 6 Turnout and Gross Margin by Dominant Ethnic Groups 
Voter Turnout  Gross Margin   




KIKUYU  80.05 6.81  91.35 16.83 
LUO 84.06 7.95  98.12 2.19 
KAMBA  67.66 8.27  96.51 4.48 
LUHYA  64.14 5.40  50.25 21.99 
KALEJIN  74.29 11.44 66.11 28.14 
MIJIKENDA  54.83 9.57  30.48 18.28 
 
                                                 
8 In an analysis of voter turnout during the 2005 Kenyan constitution referendum, Kimenyi and Shughart 
(2008) ﬁnd similar results. 
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III.   Conclusion 
This note provides rare evidence of voting behaviour in a developing country setting. 
Using survey data on voter opinions and actual voter turnout in the Kenyan elections, 
we ﬁnd evidence that ethnic voting can be explained on the basis of a minimax-regret 
strategy. Our survey indicates that there are low levels of trust amongst ethnic groups, 
likely fuelled by perceptions that the current government has favoured certain ethnic 
groups and discriminated against others. In addition, voter opinions from the survey 
suggest that the country is highly polarized along ethnic lines, a factor which could 
explain the recent episodes of ethnic violence. This points to the necessity of 
constitutional reforms that devolve power and places sufficient constraints on the 
executive so as to minimize the likelihood of ethnic-based discriminatory practices.  
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